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Abstract: The exclusion argument is widely thought to put considerable pressure on dualism 
if not to refute it outright. We argue to the contrary that, whether or not their position is 
ultimately true, dualists have a plausible response. The response focuses on the notion of 
‘distinctness’ that is employed to distinguish mental and physical properties: if ‘distinctness’ 
is understood one way, the exclusion principle on which the argument rests can be denied by 
the dualist; if it is understood another way, the argument is not persuasive.  
Keywords: Dualism, mental causation, exclusion argument, distinctness. 
1. Introduction  
On one very simple formulation, the exclusion argument against dualism starts from the 
assertion that the following theses are inconsistent: 
(1) Being in pain causes me to wince. 
(2) Being in phys causes me to wince (where ‘phys’ denotes some overall physical 
state that I am in). 
(3) Being in pain is distinct from being in phys. 
(4) If being in phys causes me to wince, nothing distinct from being in phys causes 
me to wince. 
The dualist is then invited to agree that (1) and (2) are empirical claims that are (in the context) 
non-negotiable; and that (4) is a principle of causation or an instance of a principle we must 
accept, often called ‘the exclusion principle’. The conclusion of the argument is that (3)—a 
thesis distinctive of traditional dualism—has to go. Formally speaking, the reasoning goes: (1), 
(2), and (4) are true, so (3) is not true.  
This argument is widely thought to put considerable pressure on dualism if not to refute 
it outright (see, for example, Bennett [2003] and Kim [1993, 1998]). In this paper, we argue to 
the contrary that, regardless of whether their position is ultimately true, dualists have a simple 
response, which targets the validity of the argument. We further show that this response is an 
instance of a very general strategy, which extends the way non-reductive physicalists 
sometimes respond to a similar argument, and which is of interest in its own right. 
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2. Complications set aside  
In formulating the exclusion argument in terms of (1)–(4), we are deliberately setting aside 
some complications that are not central for our analysis. We will begin by enumerating what 
those complications are. 
First, our presentation suggests that it is properties that are causal relata, but one may 
think that, strictly speaking, it is not properties that cause but instantiations of properties or 
events. We will ignore this point in what follows. Our exposition could be modified to 
accommodate it, but nothing turns on it.  
Second, although we do not go into this issue, we assume throughout that ‘causes’ 
means ‘is a sufficient cause for’, rather than merely ‘is causally relevant to’. This interpretation 
seems in line with how exclusion arguments are classically understood in the literature. Hence, 
for example, claim (4) says that if being in phys is a sufficient cause for some effect, then no 
property distinct from being in phys is a sufficient cause for it. To be even more precise, 
‘sufficient cause’ here means ‘sufficient cause in the circumstances’. For example, being in 
pain may be a sufficient cause for wincing only if certain background conditions are present, 
such as the absence of facial muscle paralysis; we may not wish to build all these background 
conditions into our specification of pain itself. For simplicity, we set this complication aside, 
taking the conditionalization on background circumstances, where required, to be understood.1  
                                                 
1 Furthermore, in keeping with classic work on the exclusion argument, one might here wish to understand 
causation, broadly, as ‘production’ or ‘generation’ rather than as ‘difference-making’ (on the distinction, see, e.g., 
Hall [2004]). If we understood causation as difference-making (as discussed, e.g., in List and Menzies [2009]), 
then it would no longer be clear that premises (1) and (2) can simultaneously hold. On a difference-making 
account, a necessary condition for A to cause B is, roughly speaking, that: 
(First conditional)  if A were present, B would also be present, and 
  (Second conditional)  if A were absent, B would also be absent.  
In the case of (1), these conditionals seem relatively unproblematic. But in the case of (2), it is not clear that the 
second conditional is true. If I wasn’t in phys, I might be in some related state phys' in which I might still wince, 
since, plausibly, the pain-triggering conditions are multiply realizable. More formally, the nearest possible worlds 
in which phys is absent may be ones in which phys' is present, which is also sufficient to make me wince. Thus 
only the mental state of being in pain may be a difference-making cause of my wincing, while the associated 
bodily state of being in phys might not [List and Menzies 2009]. By contrast, if we understand causation as 
production or generation, the falsity of the second conditional does not undermine causation. Aside from noting 
these complications, we here set aside the question of what the right account of causation is, or whether (1) and 
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Third, we are employing a simplified version of the exclusion principle in our 
formulation of (4) and are setting aside some nuances that do not matter for present purposes. 
In particular, we take (4) to be an instance of the following general principle:  
(Exclusion)  If an effect E has a sufficient cause C, then it does not have any sufficient 
cause C* that is distinct from C and that occurs at the same time (except 
in cases of genuine overdetermination).   
Since cases of genuine overdetermination—the classic example being the firing-squad case—
are not relevant to our analysis, we set them aside and pretend, for expositional simplicity, that 
(4) is true outright rather than merely true ‘in general’. Strictly speaking, however, claim (4), 
as formulated here, is a generalization that has, rather than lacks, exceptions. Furthermore, we 
omit the clause ‘that occurs at the same time’ in our formulation of (4). We take this 
qualification as understood. Relatedly, we are not carefully distinguishing direct from indirect 
causation. However, it seems implausible that (4), as stated, could be true if ‘causation’ were 
understood to mean ‘either direct or indirect causation’, for if A causes B, and B causes C, it 
may be that A causes C but not directly.  
We ignore all these complications not because we consider them unimportant, but 
because attending to them properly would needlessly distract us from our main point: the 
connection between the exclusion argument and the notion of distinctness. It is to that point 
that we now turn. 
3. Numerical and modal distinctness  
Whether there is an inconsistency in (1)–(4) depends on how ‘distinctness’ is interpreted in 
claims (3) and (4). Of course, the same thing applies, mutatis mutandis, to the other terms in 
(1)–(4); we here concentrate on ‘distinctness’.2 There are a number of different but still 
                                                 
(2) are ultimately true. Our focus is on whether the exclusion argument itself is valid, or put differently, whether 
there is an indeed an inconsistency in (1)–(4). 
2 For example, another issue on which one might focus is the interpretation of what it is to be a physical property, 
and so what phys is exactly. In the main text, we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is a clear 
interpretation of what this amounts to, but notoriously it is not obvious that this is so. To illustrate, notice that (2) 
is plausibly an instance of a more general thesis sometimes called ‘closure’, the thesis (roughly) that any 
instantiated physical property that has a (sufficient) cause has a physical cause. What, then, is a physical cause, 
and what, for that matter, is a physical property? Suppose we define it with respect to the physical theories, 
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legitimate interpretations of ‘distinctness’ (see Stoljar [2007]; see also Sandford [2005]). 
Usually the term is used to express numerical distinctness, where: 
 (Definition)  Two properties are numerically distinct if and only if they are non-
identical, that is, one property itself has a property that the other lacks.3  
But the term has philosophical uses in which it expresses relations distinct from non-identity. 
For example, when traditional dualists say that being in pain is distinct from being in phys, 
they certainly mean in part that being in pain is numerically distinct from being in phys, but 
they also mean more than this. In particular, they mean that being in pain is modally distinct 
from being in phys, where: 
 (Definition)  Two properties are modally distinct if and only if it is possible for the 
first to be instantiated and not the second and vice versa.  
That they mean this is shown, for example, by their commitment to the (metaphysical) 
possibility of zombies, creatures who, in our terminology, instantiate being in phys but not 
being in pain; and likewise it is shown by their commitment to the (metaphysical) possibility 
of ghosts, creatures who, in our terminology, instantiate being in pain but not being in phys.4 
Similarly, consider those philosophers who adhere to the Humean principle that there 
are no necessary connections between distinct existences. Such philosophers cannot have in 
mind numerical distinctness, because otherwise their principle would be refuted by cases in 
                                                 
whatever they are, that are true in the actual world. In that case, closure will be false in worlds that are exact 
duplicates of this world but which have twin-mass and twin-charge rather than mass and charge (where ‘twin-
mass’ is a property that plays a similar role as mass but is otherwise different). Suppose we define it with respect 
to the physical theories, whatever they are, that are true in some possible world or other. In that case, it is plausible 
that closure is consistent with various possibilities at which intuitively physicalism is false. As we indicate, we 
will set aside these issues here, but for some discussion, see Stoljar [2010]. 
3 This definition of numerical distinctness implies the identity of indiscernibles: if F and G each have the same 
properties, then F and G are identical. Strictly speaking, this principle is not needed for our subsequent argument. 
It may be sufficient to assume the indiscernibility of identicals: if F and G are identical, then each have the same 
properties. But if the notion of a property is understood broadly enough, the identity of indiscernibles is not 
objectionable: for example, if F has the property of being F, and G has the same property, then obviously F and 
G must be identical. We thank an anonymous referee for prompting us to clarify this point. 
4 Of course, some positions sometimes called ‘dualism’ would deny these possibilities, e.g., so-called necessitarian 
or emergentist variants of dualism. We set aside such variants here.  
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which one thing necessitates another, that is, one thing is necessarily connected to a 
numerically distinct thing. It is better, then, to interpret them as intending a distinct notion of 
distinctness, for example modal distinctness. 
For a down-to-earth illustration of how numerical distinctness and modal distinctness 
come apart, consider the properties ‘being red’ and ‘being coloured’. Being red is numerically 
distinct from being coloured; but being red is not modally distinct from being coloured, since 
it is impossible that something is red without being coloured.5 
4. Fine-grainedness and the inconsistency in (1)–(4)  
Returning to (1)–(4), if the interpretation of ‘distinctness’ in (3) coincides with the one in (4), 
then the inconsistency between the four claims clearly arises, assuming no equivocation 
elsewhere. But the inconsistency may even arise when the two interpretations of ‘distinctness’ 
do not coincide, provided a particular condition is met, as we now show. Let us begin with a 
preliminary definition: 
(Definition)  One interpretation of ‘distinctness’ is at least as fine-grained as a second 
if any two properties that count as distinct under the second 
interpretation also count as distinct under the first.  
For instance, numerical distinctness is at least as fine-grained as modal distinctness: any two 
properties that are modally distinct must also be numerically distinct. In fact, we can say 
something stronger. Call one interpretation of ‘distinctness’ more coarse-grained than a second 
if that second interpretation is at least as fine-grained as the first but not vice versa. Then modal 
distinctness is more coarse-grained than numerical distinctness. While any two modally distinct 
properties are also numerically distinct, the converse is not true: there are many properties that 
are numerically distinct, but not modally so—being red and being coloured, for instance. 
Generally, the binary relation ‘at least as fine-grained as’ partially orders different 
interpretations of ‘distinctness’. (The ordering is partial, because, logically, there is no 
guarantee that any two interpretations of distinctness will be comparable in terms of fineness 
of grain.) Going back to (1)–(4), the following result holds: 
                                                 
5 For another, more philosophical illustration (drawing on Fine [1994]), being Socrates is numerically distinct 
from being Socrates’ singleton, but being Socrates is not modally distinct from being Socrates’ singleton, since 
necessarily if the first is instantiated so too is the second.  
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 (Proposition) Even if the interpretations of ‘distinctness’ in (3) and (4) may come 
apart, the inconsistency between (1)–(4) arises if and only if the 
interpretation of ‘distinctness’ in (4) is at least as fine-grained as the one 
in (3), assuming no equivocation elsewhere.  
The proof of this point is straightforward. Suppose the interpretation of ‘distinctness’ in (4) is 
at least as fine-grained as the one in (3). Then, if being in pain and being in phys are distinct in 
the sense of (3), they are also distinct in the sense of (4) and hence (4) implies that they cannot 
both cause me to wince, contradicting (1) and (2). Conversely, suppose the interpretation of 
‘distinctness’ in (4) is not at least as fine-grained as the one in (3). Then we cannot rule out—
logically speaking—that being in pain is distinct from being in phys in the sense of (3), but not 
in the sense of (4), and consequently there is no inconsistency. We now show that these 
observations about distinctness give rise to a very general strategy by which we can respond to 
the exclusion argument in several of its variants.6   
5. The exclusion argument and non-reductive physicalism 
It is instructive to begin by considering a variant of the exclusion argument (for example, in 
Kim [1998, 2005]) that is directed not against dualism but against the distinct position of non-
reductive physicalism. This is the thesis that being in pain and being in phys are numerically 
distinct even though the second necessitates the first. Like the dualist, the non-reductive 
physicalist is presented with (1)–(4) and then invited to agree that (1) and (2) are (in the context) 
non-negotiable and that (4) is a principle of causation that cannot be given up. The conclusion 
is that (3)—a thesis distinctive of non-reductive physicalism—has to go. 
Granting—for the sake of argument—that (1) and (2) are true, the non-reductive 
physicalist may argue that, properly understood, (1)–(4) present no inconsistency. Here is why. 
If non-reductive physicalism is true, (3) had better mean (3-num) rather than (3-mod): 
(3-num) Being in pain is numerically distinct from being in phys. 
(3-mod) Being in pain is modally distinct from being in phys. 
This is because non-reductive physicalists are not saying that it is possible for someone to be 
in phys and yet not to be in pain; their whole point is to deny that possibility. But if it is 
                                                 
6 It is worth emphasizing that this strategy is different from the one based on difference-making causation defended 
in List and Menzies [2009]. Compare footnote 1. 
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(3-num) rather than (3-mod) that is in play, then, in order for the inconsistency to be 
maintained, (4) had better mean (4-num) rather than (4-mod): 
(4-num)  If being in phys causes me to wince, nothing numerically distinct from 
being in phys causes me to wince. 
(4-mod) If being in phys causes me to wince, nothing modally distinct from being 
in phys causes me to wince. 
As we have noted, modal distinctness is more coarse-grained than numerical distinctness, and 
thus interpreting (4) as (4-mod) in the presence of (3-num) would violate our necessary and 
sufficient condition for the inconsistency in (1)–(4) to arise. Now, however, the non-reductive 
physicalist may argue that there are reasons to reject (4-num) that are not also reasons to reject 
(4-mod). In light of these reasons, the non-reductive physicalist can assert that what is true is 
only (1), (2), (3-num), and (4-mod). And from this, nothing of interest follows.7 
What are the reasons to reject (4-num) that are not also reasons to reject (4-mod)? Well, 
consider Yablo’s pigeon, Sophie, who is trained to peck at a red card at the exclusion of others 
[Yablo 1993]. A red card is produced, and Sophie pecks. As Yablo notes, most people would 
unhesitatingly say that the redness of the card is what caused Sophie to peck. But of course red 
cards are not just red; they are specific shades of red—scarlet say. Surely being scarlet is a 
property of the card that is causally sufficient to get Sophie to peck, at least in the context. But 
then, by (4-num) or the principle behind it, being red cannot be a cause. If this is a bad result, 
and we want both being red and being scarlet to count as causes, (4-num) is false. By way of 
contrast, we should note that Yablo’s pigeon is no counterexample to (4-mod). Being scarlet 
and being red are numerically distinct but they are not modally distinct. So, as far as this 
example goes, we may agree with Yablo that (4-num) is false, but still maintain the truth of (4-
mod). 
To be sure, every example is controversial in some way or another; but it is not 
necessary for our purposes to defend Yablo’s example in detail. Rather we will assume that it 
is convincing, and in consequence that the exclusion argument against non-reductive 
physicalism is dialectically ineffective. 
                                                 
7 The non-reductive physicalist may also assert that the exclusion argument seems successful to so many people 
only because they have failed to attend to the distinction between (4-num) and (4-mod).  
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6. Different kinds of modal distinctness  
If non-reductive physicalists can use the distinctions in distinction to counter the variant of the 
exclusion argument that attacks them, can dualists do something similar? To make a case that 
they can, we now show that, while we can and should distinguish between numerical and modal 
distinctness, we may also distinguish among various kinds of modal distinctness. We begin by 
noting that there are different interpretations of ‘possibility’: metaphysical possibility, 
nomological possibility, and so on. As is well known, some interpretations of possibility are 
more permissive than others, rendering more things possible. For example, metaphysical 
possibility is more permissive than nomological possibility; the latter requires compatibility 
with the laws of nature, the former does not. Accordingly, something can be metaphysically 
possible without being nomologically possible. Indeed, that’s what dualists like Chalmers 
[1996] would say about zombies. On that account, there are metaphysically possible worlds in 
which someone could be in phys without being in pain, but those worlds are not permitted by 
our actual laws of nature. Generally, a coherent scenario involving departures from the laws of 
nature may still count as metaphysically possible, even though it is not nomologically possible; 
if you like, think of a universe with different natural constants that is otherwise well-behaved.  
Now observe the following: there exists not only a single interpretation of ‘modal 
distinctness’, but a family of such interpretations, one for each interpretation of ‘possibility’ 
that might be used in defining modal distinctness. For example, two properties are modally 
distinct in a metaphysical sense if it is metaphysically possible for each to be instantiated 
without the other also being instantiated; two properties are modally distinct in a nomological 
sense if this is nomologically possible; and so on.  
So far, by ‘modal distinctness’ we have tacitly meant ‘modal distinctness in the 
metaphysical sense’. Let us disambiguate our terminology by saying that two properties are 
metaphysically distinct just in case they are modally distinct in the metaphysical sense, while 
two properties are nomologically distinct just in case they are modally distinct in the 
nomological sense. To see that these two notions do not coincide, recall for instance that, for 
the dualist, being in pain and being in phys are metaphysically distinct but they need not be 
nomologically distinct. Dualists usually hold that psychological properties are nomologically 
connected to physical properties, because of certain psycho-physical laws that hold in the actual 
world (see, for example, Chalmers [1996]). 
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It should be clear that, just as numerical distinctness is more fine-grained than modal 
distinctness, so too metaphysical distinctness is more fine-grained than nomological 
distinctness. More generally: 
(Proposition)  Whenever one interpretation of ‘possibility’ is more restrictive than 
another—such as nomological possibility as compared to metaphysical 
possibility—then the resultant interpretation of modal distinctness is 
more coarse-grained under the first, more restrictive interpretation of 
possibility than under the second, less restrictive one.8 
Before proving this claim, let us give an informal gloss. What this proposition says is that under 
a more restrictive interpretation of ‘possibility’ it is harder for two properties to count as 
modally distinct than it is under a more permissive interpretation of ‘possibility’. And so an 
interpretation of modal distinctness resulting from a more restrictive notion of ‘possibility’ is 
more coarse-grained than one resulting from a more permissive notion of ‘possibility’.  
To prove the claim formally, suppose ‘possibility1’ is more restrictive than 
‘possibility2’, in the sense that anything that is possible1 is also possible2 but not vice versa, 
and let ‘distinctness1’ and ‘distinctness2’ be the corresponding interpretations of modal 
distinctness. To show that ‘distinctness1’ is more coarse-grained than ‘distinctness2’, we need 
to show that the latter is at least as fine-grained as the former—call this claim (i)—but not vice 
versa—call this claim (ii). Suppose, then, that two given properties are distinct1. This means 
that it is possible1 for each to be instantiated without the other. Since this is possible1, it is also 
possible2, and so the two properties are also distinct2. This establishes claim (i). To establish 
claim (ii), notice that the set of worlds that are possible1 is a proper subset of the set of worlds 
that are possible2. Let us assume (without much loss of generality) that there are at least two 
additional worlds in the second set. We can then ‘construct’ two properties which are co-
instantiated across all worlds that are possible1 but which suitably come apart in other worlds. 
Consider Figure 1. Let the large oval represent all worlds that are possible2, and let the smaller 
oval inside represent all worlds that are possible1. For labelling purposes, call the worlds in the 
small oval the R-worlds, those in the shaded left half-disk the Q-worlds, and those in the white 
right half-disk the S-worlds. (The assumption that there are at least two additional worlds 
outside the small oval is needed to ensure that the sets of Q- and S-worlds can each be chosen 
                                                 
8 To be precise, for this claim to hold, the less restrictive interpretation of ‘possibility’ must render possible at 
least two additional worlds compared to the more restrictive interpretation, as explained in the proof below. 
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to be non-empty.) Now let P1 be a property that is instantiated in all Q-worlds and all R-worlds 
(and nowhere else), and let P2 be a property that is instantiated in all R-worlds and all S-worlds 
(and nowhere else). Then P1 and P2 are not distinct1, because they are co-instantiated in all 
worlds that are possible1, but they are distinct2, because it is possible2 for each to be instantiated 
without the other (namely, in the Q-worlds and the S-worlds, respectively). This completes the 
proof. 
 
Figure 1: Some possible worlds 
7. The exclusion argument and dualism  
In light of the distinction between metaphysical and nomological distinctness, the dualist, like 
the non-reductive physicalist, may argue that (1)–(4), when properly understood, present no 
inconsistency. For the dualist, (3) had better mean (3-met) rather than (3-nom): 
(3-met) Being in phys is metaphysically distinct from being in pain. 
(3-nom) Being in phys is nomologically distinct from being in pain. 
This is because dualists are not denying that psychological properties are nomologically 
connected to physical properties; on the contrary, as we have observed, they usually assert that 
they are (see, for example, Chalmers [1996]). On the other hand, if (3-met) rather than (3-nom) 
is in play, then, in order for the inconsistency to be maintained, (4) had better mean (4-met) 
rather than (4-nom): 
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(4-met)  If being in phys causes me to wince, nothing metaphysically distinct 
from being in phys causes me to wince. 
(4-nom)  If being in phys causes me to wince, nothing nomologically distinct from 
being in phys causes me to wince. 
For, otherwise, the condition for the inconsistency would be violated. But—and here is the 
point—the dualist may argue that there are reasons to reject (4-met) that are not also reasons 
to reject (4-nom). In the light of these reasons, the dualist may assert that what is true is only 
(1), (2), (3-met), and (4-nom). And from this, again, nothing of interest follows.9 
8. Reasons to reject (4-met) 
What are the reasons to reject (4-met) that are not also reasons to reject (4-nom)? To approach 
this issue, imagine that we have two properties F and F* that are nomologically connected to 
each other in a particularly dramatic way: they are ‘nomologically co-extensive’; that is, in all 
possible worlds that share the same laws as our world, F and F* are co-instantiated. It does not 
follow from this that F and F* are numerically identical, since it might be that in a remote 
possible world, at which the laws that obtain at our world do not hold, something is F and not 
F* (or vice versa). But now suppose that as a matter of fact F is causally sufficient for some 
effect E. Is F* likewise causally sufficient? If we hold a version of an exclusion principle that 
we began with, the one that involves numerical distinctness— that is, (4-num)—the answer is 
no. For F and F* are numerically distinct; hence, according to (4-num), F* is not causally 
sufficient for E if F is. But on the other hand, this conclusion is implausible. If F and F* are 
nomologically co-extensive as we supposed, it may well be that both are causally sufficient for 
the effect. For example, to the extent that we are prepared to say, of F, that ‘if it were not 
instantiated, E would not have happened’, we should be prepared to say exactly the same thing 
of F*. Likewise, it may be that both properties are nomologically connected to E in the right 
way. More generally, if F and F* are nomologically co-extensive, the most natural thing to say 
is that either both are causally sufficient or neither is. (In fact, there is a perfectly natural sense 
in which the laws themselves may be said not to distinguish between F and F*.) It is implausible 
to conclude that neither property is causally sufficient; hence both are, and (4-num)—which 
obliges us to deny this—should be rejected.  
                                                 
9 The dualist may also assert that the exclusion argument seems successful to so many people only because they 
have failed to attend to the distinction between (4-met) and (4-nom). 
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 Now so far, you might say, so familiar. We already had a reason to reject (4-num); at 
best, what we have just done is provide a related reason for the same conclusion. However, a 
small variation on the point just considered gives us a reason to reject, not simply (4-num), but 
(4-met) as well. Imagine that there is not simply a remote possible world at which something 
is F but not F* but also a different but equally remote possible world at which the reverse is 
true. That is sufficient for showing, not simply that F and F* are numerically distinct but that 
they are metaphysically distinct as well. On the other hand, apart from this change, the situation 
is precisely the same as before. In particular, if we suppose that F is causally sufficient for E, 
we would be obliged by (4-met) to say that F* is not causally sufficient. And, as before, this is 
objectionable; since F and F* are nomologically co-extensive, a natural thing to say is that 
either both are causally sufficient or neither is. But it is implausible that neither is causally 
sufficient. Hence both are, and (4-met) should be rejected.   
To reject (4-met) in this way, however, is not to reject (4-nom). What (4-nom) says is 
that if F causes E, then no property nomologically distinct from F causes E. But since F* is not 
nomologically distinct from F, the principle does not apply. More generally, we have a reason 
to reject (4-met) that is not a reason to reject (4-nom). More generally still, we have an answer 
to the exclusion problem from the point of view of the dualist.   
9. A false principle?   
It might be objected that the argument we just gave against (4-met) relies on a principle that is 
false. The principle asserts, or implies, that if F is causally sufficient for E, and F is 
nomologically co-extensive with F*, then F* is also causally sufficient for E. And that 
principle, so the objection goes, is subject to counterexample. Suppose that F* is the 
conjunctive property of being F and being such that 2+2=4. In that case, F* is nomologically 
co-extensive with F and yet, one might think, it is not causally sufficient for E—not because it 
is not sufficient in some sense or other, but because it is not even a causally relevant property. 
In particular, note the irrelevance of the second conjunct, ‘being such that 2+2=4’.10 
 We have two things to say in response to this objection. In the first place, we are not 
convinced that F and F* as just defined are genuinely distinct properties at all. Here is why. 
For a start, F and F* are not merely nomologically co-extensive, but metaphysically so; it is 
metaphysically impossible for either of them to be instantiated without the other. But even 
                                                 
10 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
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more importantly, ‘F*’ might be viewed as a more cumbersome (though extensionally 
equivalent) re-description of F, which simply adds to the original description a redundant 
conjunct, namely, a tautological one. On a plausible criterion of property individuation, ‘F’ and 
‘F*’ might therefore be said to pick out the same property. Plausibly, properties should be 
individuated more coarsely than property descriptions: for each property, there exists an entire 
equivalence class of possible descriptions. For example, we would not want to treat the 
conjunctive property descriptions ‘F and F’, ‘F and F and F’, and so on, as picking out 
properties distinct from F itself. Rather, ‘F’, ‘F and F’, and ‘F and F and F’ are just different 
descriptions of the same property, some of which are more parsimonious than others. If this is 
right, it would not be a mistake to say that F* is causally sufficient for E, if F itself is. It would 
just be more cumbersome. 
 But in the second place, our argument against (4-met) does not rely on the principle 
targeted by the present objection. Recall that that principle asserts (or implies) that if F is 
causally sufficient for E, and F is nomologically co-extensive with F*, then F* is also causally 
sufficient for E. We need not take a stand on whether this principle is true. Our claim is rather 
two-fold: first that (4-num) should be rejected since it entails that if F is causally sufficient for 
E in the circumstances, then F* is not causally sufficient (when in fact we would not always 
want to rule out F*’s causal sufficiency); and second that if (4-num) should be rejected on those 
grounds, then (4-met) should be rejected mutatis mutandis.   
 In virtue of what might two nomologically co-extensive properties, such as F and F*, 
each be causally sufficient for E? That is clearly a difficult question in the philosophy of 
causation, but one suggestion that is consonant with our discussion is that they are both causally 
sufficient for E in virtue of their being nomologically connected to E in the right way, or 
exhibiting the right pattern of counterfactual connection to E, and so forth. Of course, there are 
some (very big) philosophical questions about these conditions; we will not go into them here. 
The important point for present purposes is this. It is often accepted that the non-reductive 
physicalist may say that a physical property and a mental property that is supervenient on it are 
both causally sufficient for some effect E on the grounds of both standing in the right 
nomological or counterfactual relation to E.11 It is then hard to see why the dualist may not say 
                                                 
11 As Yablo puts it [1992: 273], ‘for all that the exclusion argument shows, mental phenomena can be causally 
relevant compatibly with the causal sufficiency of their physical bases’. Yablo carefully qualifies this claim and 
also distinguishes causation simpliciter from causal sufficiency. Causes, he says, must be ‘commensurate with 
their effects: roughly, they should incorporate a good deal of causally important material but not too much that is 
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the analogous thing, where the metaphysical modality associated with supervenience is 
replaced by a nomological one, with everything else remaining structurally the same, especially 
as we focus on worlds that have the same laws of nature as ours. 
10. Lack of example? 
It might also be objected that the reason for rejecting (4-met) is importantly different from the 
reason for rejecting (4-num) considered earlier. In that earlier case, the reason was a 
straightforward counterexample in the form of Yablo’s pigeon, whereas in the new case, our 
argument is more abstract: we have not given an explicit counterexample to (4-met). However, 
there are two reasons why this does not undermine the plausibility of the suggested response 
of the dualist to the exclusion argument.    
 In the first place, the reason to reject (4-met) builds on the reason to reject (4-num). 
What Yablo’s example brings out is that a version of the exclusion principle that invokes 
numerical distinctness is implausible precisely because the opposite of distinctness in that sense 
(that is, identity) is such an unforgiving relation: all it takes for F to be numerically distinct 
from G is for F to have one feature that G does not. But a similar point applies to metaphysical 
distinctness: all it takes for F to be metaphysically distinct from G is for there to be possible 
worlds at which F obtains and G does not and vice versa. But since the worlds in question can 
be as remote as you please, it becomes hard to see how their existence can have any impact on 
causal facts that are sensitive only to worlds nomologically similar to our own.  
 In the second place, while we have not relied on examples to defeat (4-met), it is not 
impossible to do so. We here offer just two sketchy illustrations; nothing much depends on 
them, however. Suppose, for example, I am in an overall physical condition that includes as a 
proper part the fact that a particular neuronal cluster in my brain has property P1—call this 
condition NP1. It seems plausible to say that my being in NP1 is causally sufficient to get me 
to wince; at any rate, it is true that if I were in NP1, I would wince. Now contrast this condition 
with a metaphysically distinct condition NP2. NP2 is exactly like NP1 except that it includes 
as a proper part the fact that the same neuronal cluster has property P2. NP2 is nomologically 
                                                 
causally unimportant’ [1992: 274]. This might, in turn, lead us to conclude that only the mental property, and not 
the physical one, is a cause simpliciter, while both properties might be causally sufficient in the more permissive 
sense (see also List and Menzies [2009]). Be that as it may, it seems fair to suggest that, according to non-reductive 
physicalism, mental sufficient causes may (under certain conditions) coexist with physical sufficient causes, 
provided both stand in the right relationship to one another and to the effect in question. 
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connected to NP1 because, relative to the actual biological laws governing human brains, the 
co-occurrence of NP1 and NP2 is nomologically necessary. However, they are metaphysically 
distinct because there are more remote possible worlds—worlds with a subtly different brain 
biology—at which P2 is instantiated and P1 is not (and vice versa). It seems plausible to say 
that my being in NP2 is causally sufficient to get me to wince too; it is also true that if I were 
in NP2, I would wince. But that could not be true if (4-met) is true.  
For another example, suppose a junior lecturer loses his job because the university 
rejects his application for tenure; hence the university’s making this decision—a property of 
the university—causes the lecturer’s job loss. But suppose that, as a robust empirical 
regularity—a ‘social-scientific law’—the committee that votes on these matters always 
consists of the most successful professors; they are reliably chosen to serve on the committee. 
Then it is also true that the most successful professors’ judgment—a property of the 
professors—causes the lecturer’s job loss. In this example, the university’s decision is 
nomologically connected to the most successful professors’ judgment: first, as we have 
assumed, there is a robust regularity ensuring that those professors are the members of the 
relevant committee; and, second, we may assume that a dismissal of a junior lecturer without 
that committee’s vote is ruled out by the university’s by-laws. But despite this nomological 
connection, the two apparently competing causes are clearly metaphysically distinct: for 
example, it is metaphysically possible for other professors to serve on the committee, or for the 
by-laws to be different, so that the judgments of the most successful professors do not influence 
the decision. So (4-met) implies that the university’s decision and the most successful 
professors’ judgment cannot both cause the lecturer’s job loss. If this implication is 
unacceptable, we have reason to deny (4-met). At the same time, there is no conflict with (4-
nom), since the two properties in question are nomologically connected.  
 Of course, these two examples, like any, may be controversial in some way or another. 
But, on the face of it at least, they do seem to make the point the dualist wants to make. And in 
any case, our official reason for rejecting (4-met) without equally rejecting (4-nom) does not 
depend on either example. 
11. Conclusion 
We have argued that in response to the exclusion problem, a dualist could say that, whereas 
dualism requires psychological properties to be modally distinct from physical properties in a 
metaphysical sense, any plausible version of the exclusion principle refers only to properties 
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that are modally distinct in a nomological sense. The dualist could then go on to point out that 
being in pain and being in phys are modally distinct in a metaphysical sense but not in a 
nomological sense and that, therefore, the exclusion problem does not arise. 
 But it is important to emphasize two limitations on our discussion. First, we have 
focused on what we may call ‘strong’ variants of the exclusion argument, which try to establish 
that it is not the case that being in pain causes wincing if being in phys does. But there might 
be variants of the argument that try to show something less, for example, that we have no 
reason to suppose that being in pain causes wincing if being in phys does. We have said nothing 
about those weaker, epistemic variants of the exclusion argument. Our point is only that if one 
is convinced of dualism, then there is a reply available to the kind of ‘strong’ exclusion 
argument we have focused on. 
 Second, we have focused only on what someone convinced of dualism could say to the 
exclusion argument. But we have said nothing about whether anybody should be convinced of 
dualism. For example, dualism is usually interpreted as being committed to the view that 
consciousness is a fundamental element in nature, akin to basic fundamental physical features. 
Many philosophers find this very implausible on its face, quite apart from any technical issues 
raised by the exclusion argument. There is nothing in the present paper to suggest that those 
who find dualism implausible are wrong. Moreover, many think that the positive arguments 
for dualism are not convincing (see, for example, Stoljar [2006]). However, even if there is no 
reason to believe dualism—indeed even if dualism is false—it may also be that one of the key 
arguments against it has a plausible answer. 
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